New inequalities for probability functions in the two-person
  red-and-black game by Fechner, Włodzimierz
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
00
35
9v
3 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
27
 M
ar 
20
19
NEW INEQUALITIES FOR PROBABILITY FUNCTIONS IN THE
TWO-PERSON RED-AND-BLACK GAME
WŁODZIMIERZ FECHNER
Abstract. We discuss a model of a two-person, non-cooperative stochastic
game, inspired by the discrete version of the red-and-black gambling prob-
lem presented by Dubins and Savage. Assume that two players hold certain
amounts of money. At each stage of the game they simultaneously bid some
part of their current fortune and the probability of winning or loosing depends
on their bids. In many models of the red-and-black game it is assumed that the
win probability is a function of the quotient of the bid of the first player and the
sum of both bids. In the literature some additional properties, like concavity
or super-multiplicativity are assumed in order to ensure that bold and timid
strategy is the Nash equilibrium. Our aim is to provide a generalization in
which the probability of winning is a two-variable function which depends on
both bids. We introduce two new functional inequalities whose solutions lead
to win probability functions for which a Nash equilibrium is realized by the
bold-timid strategy. Since both inequalities have not easy intuitive meanings,
we discuss them in a separate section of the paper and we give there some
illustrating examples.
1. Introduction
The red-and-black gaming problem goes back to L.E. Dubins and L.J. Savage
[3]. P. Secchi [10] dealt with a two-person red-and-black game in which the first
player wants to maximize the probability of winning a certain amount of money,
while the second player wants to keep his opponent from this. L. Pontiggia [8, 9]
proposed a modification in which the players’ win probabilities can possibly change
at each stage of the game. Later, M.-R. Chen and S.-R. Hsiau [1,2], Y.-C. Yao and
M.-R. Chen [11] provided further modifications and generalizations. The purpose
of the paper is to present a yet another generalization of the model, in which the
win probability is a two-variable function which depends on the two bids.
The problem can be described shortly as follows. Two players start the game
with some initial fortunes, say x0 and y0 being positive integers. The first player
wants to reach a goal, which is an integer M1 greater than x0 and not greater than
x0 + y0, and the second player also wants to reach his goal M2, which is an integer
between y0 and x0 + y0. Later on we will assume that M1 = M2 = x0 + y0. The
two players bet at each stage of the game an amount which is a nonnegative integer
not greater than their current fortunes. If a current fortune of the first player is
x and he stakes an amount a, a current fortune of the second player is y and he
stakes an amount b, then their next fortunes will be x + b and y − b, respectively
with probability P , or x − a and y + a, respectively with probability 1 − P . We
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will assume that the probability P depends upon a and b. The game lasts until one
of the players reaches his goal. For technical reasons we admit the possibility that
a = 0 or b = 0. In this case P is equal to 0 and 1, respectively, and therefore in
case of such bets nothing happens with the player’ fortunes (i.e. a bet of zero units
gives a sure victory for the opponent, regardless his choice). We also assume that
at every stage of the game each player choose his action without any knowledge of
the action chosen by the opponent. Thus the game we consider is non-cooperative.
Assume that the bet of player I is equal to a and the bet of player II to b.
Then the fair probability P for the first player to win would be a/(a+ b). In [8, 9]
a class of probabilities under which the game is sub- or superfair is given. The
authors of [1, 2] assumed that the probability of winning is a function f : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] which depends upon the value a/(a+ b). It turned out that convexity and
supermultiplicativity of function f imply that the bold-timid strategy is a Nash
equilibrium for the game. In the present paper we will develop this research further
and instead of function f(a/(a+ b)) of one variable, we will work with a two-place
win probability function P (a, b).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we formally define the
model of the game. First, we check when the game is subfair. Then, we prove
that if a certain inequality is satisfied, then an optimal strategy for first player is
to play boldly when the second player plays timidly. Next, we provide conditions
under which it is best for the second player to bet timidly when the first player
plays boldly. In Section 3 we solve two functional inequalities which are introduced
in Section 2. Last section of the paper is devoted to some examples and final
comments.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that R denotes the set of real numbers, Z
is the set of integers, N stands for the set of positive integers and N0 = N ∪ {0}.
Moreover, for a, b from R or from R ∪ {−∞,+∞} respectively, open, closed and
half-open intervals with endpoints a and b are denoted by (a, b), [a, b], [a, b) and
(a, b], respectively.
2. The game
Assume that we are given an integerM ≥ 2 which represents the total amount of
money in the system. The initial fortune of player I is equal to x0 ∈ N and of player
II to y0 ∈ N. We assume for simplicity that x0 + y0 = M and the goal for both
players is to to win the amount of M . Therefore the state space for both players is
the set S = {0, 1, . . . ,M} and the game terminates when one of the player reaches
0 or M . The possible actions of a player are {0, . . . , t}. A strategy is called timid,
if at each stage of the game the player bets just one unit of his current wealth. A
strategy is called bold, if the player always bets his entire fortune.
Now, let us describe the law of motions in our model. We need a function which
assigns the probability of victory as a function of bets of the players. Assume that
P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies the border conditions:
(1) P (a, 0) = 1, P (0, b) = 0, a, b ∈ S \ {0}.
The value P (0, 0) can be undefined. As some places we will make a natural assump-
tion that P is nondecreasing with respect to the first variable and nonincreasing
with respect to the second one. This means that the chances for winning the turn
are better if the player bets (and thus risks) more. Let Xn denote a random variable
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which is equal to the fortune of player I at a time n ∈ N and suppose he bets an
amount an ∈ {0, . . . , Xn}. Simultaneously, let the fortune of player II at the same
time be denoted by Yn and assume that he bets bn ∈ {0, . . . , Yn}. In our model the
laws of motions for the players are defined by formulas
X1 = x0, Y1 = y0,(2)
Xn+1 =
{
Xn + bn, with probability P (an, bn),
Xn − an, with probability 1− P (an, bn),
(3)
Yn+1 = M −Xn+1,(4)
for n ∈ N.
We assume that the sets of possible actions of both players contain zero. How-
ever, as a rule of the game, they are not allowed to bet zero units whenever their
fortunes are positive. Then condition (1) means that a hypothetical bet of zero
units by any player has no effect on the game (in a sense that the fortunes of both
players don’t change during this stage). In particular, from this it follows that
Xn+1 = Xn and Yn+1 = Yn whenever Xn ∈ {0,M}. Therefore, we can think of
(Xn) and (Yn) as of infinite sequences.
A special case of this model, when
(5) P (a, b) = f
(
a
a+ b
)
, a, b ∈ S
with some function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] was studied by M.-R. Chen and S.-R. Hsiau in
[1]. This in turn is a generalization of L. Pontiggia models [8, 9]. Our subsequent
results can be therefore viewed as an extension of this research. Our approach is
motivated by these fine articles.
The game is called subfair if the process Xn is a supermartingale. Similarly,
the game is superfair if the process Xn is a submartingale. We begin with an easy
condition upon P which implies that the game is sub- or superfair regardless the
strategies of both players. This result is a slight modification of the first part of
[8, Theorem 3.1], see also [1, p. 907].
Proposition 1. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is an arbitrary mapping and we
consider a discrete two-person red-and-black game with the law of motions described
by formulas (2), (3) and (4). Then the game is subfair if and only if
P (a, b) ≤
a
a+ b
, a, b ∈ S, a+ b ≤M.
The reverse inequality holds true if and only if the game is superfair.
Proof. Fix n ∈ N. We have
E[Xn+1|Xn] = (Xn + bn)P (an, bn) + (Xn − an)[1− P (an, bn)]
= Xn + (an + bn)
[
P (an, bn)−
an
an + bn
]
.
Thus, if bids of both players at the n-th stage of the game are equal to an and bn, re-
spectively, then the sequence (Xn) of random variables is a sub- or supermartingale
iff the value in the last square bracket is positive, or negative, respectively. 
Next, we are going to prove a counterpart to [1, Theorem 2.1] by M.-R. Chen
and S.-R. Hsiau. They showed that a convexity of f given by (5) is a sufficient
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condition for the fact that the bold strategy is best for player I if player II plays
timidly and the game is subfair. We propose another functional inequality to obtain
an analogous effect. However, we do not generalize [1, Theorem 2.1], but instead we
provide a new class of win probability functions. We will work with a one-variable
map ϕ : S → [0, 1] defined as
(6) ϕ(x) = P (x, 1), x ∈ S.
Before we proceed with the theorem, we will recall some crucial notions. We
refer the reader to the monograph of A.P. Maitra and W.D. Sudderth [7] for a com-
prehensive treatment of the topic. We say that a function Q : S → R∪ {−∞,+∞}
is excessive for some game γ at a point x ∈ S if either E[Q] is undefined or it
is defined and E[Q] ≤ Q(x). A strategy σ is a sequence σ0, σ1, . . . such that σ0
is a gamble and for n = 1, 2, . . . σn is a function which maps a partial history
(x1, . . . , xn) of the game a gamble σn(x1, . . . , xn). If a strategy σ of a player is
given, then Q is excessive for σ at x ∈ S if it is excessive at σ0 and for every
partial history (x1, . . . , xn) of positive probability of occurrence Q is excessive for
the gamble σn(x1, . . . , xn) at the point xn.
The following theorem provides a criterion for optimality of a strategy in terms
of excessivity of some mapping.
Theorem 1 (A.P. Maitra and W.D. Sudderth [7], Theorem 3.3.10). A strategy σ
is optimal if and only if the function Q : S → R ∪ {−∞,+∞} given by
Q(x) = u(σ(x)), x inS
is excessive, where u is the utility function.
For our purposes, we will restrict ourselves to the case when u is equal to the
identity mapping.
Theorem 2. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies (1) and
the map ϕ : S → [0, 1] given by (6) is a nondecreasing solution of the inequality
(7) ϕ(y)− ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(x − y)[ϕ(y)− 1],
for x, y ∈ S such that y ≤ x. We consider a discrete two-person red-and-black game
with the law of motions described by formulas (2), (3) and (4). Assume that player
II plays a timid strategy. Then the bold strategy is best for player I.
Proof. First, we will verify inductively that
(8) [1− ϕ(a)]
a∏
i=0
ϕ(x− i) ≤ ϕ(x) − ϕ(a)
for every x ∈ {0, . . . ,M} and a ∈ {0, . . . , x}. If a = 0, then clearly
[1− ϕ(0)]ϕ(x) = ϕ(x)− ϕ(0),
since ϕ(0) = 0. Now, assume that (8) holds true for some a ∈ S and all x ∈
{a, . . . ,M}. We will prove it for a+ 1. If ϕ(a) = 1, then ϕ(a+ 1) = 1 and we are
done. Thus, we assume that ϕ(a) < 1. Take some x ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,M}; we have
[1− ϕ(a+ 1)]
a+1∏
i=0
ϕ(x− i) =
[1− ϕ(a+ 1)]
[1− ϕ(a)]
[1− ϕ(a)]ϕ(x − (a+ 1))
a∏
i=0
ϕ(x − i)
≤
[1− ϕ(a+ 1)]
[1− ϕ(a)]
ϕ(x− (a+ 1))[ϕ(x) − ϕ(a)].
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Therefore, it is enough to show that
[1− ϕ(a+ 1)]ϕ(x− (a+ 1))[ϕ(x) − ϕ(a)] ≤ [1− ϕ(a)][ϕ(x) − ϕ(a+ 1)].
Since ϕ ≤ 1 and ϕ is nondecreasing, then we are done if we prove
[1− ϕ(a+ 1)]ϕ(x − (a+ 1)) ≤ ϕ(x) − ϕ(a+ 1).
This in turn follows directly from inequality (7) applied for y = x− (a+ 1).
Since player II plays timidly, then the law of motions of player I who plays boldly
takes the form: X1 = x0 ∈ S,
Xn+1 =
{
Xn + 1, with probability ϕ(Xn),
0, with probability 1− ϕ(Xn),
whenever 0 < Xn < M and Xn+1 = Xn if Xn ∈ {0,M}.
Denote by Q(x) the probability of victory for player I who has an initial fortune
x, i.e.
Q(x) = P{Xm = M for some m ∈ N}.
It is clear that Q(0) = 0, Q(M) = 1 and
Q(x) = ϕ(x)Q(x + 1), x ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}.
Easily one obtains an inductive extension of the above formula:
(9) Q(x− a) =
a∏
i=0
ϕ(x− i)Q(x+ 1), x ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, a ∈ {0, . . . , x}.
In view of Theorem 1, in order to finish the proof it is enough to prove that function
Q is excessive. This means that we need to verify inequality
ϕ(a)Q(x + 1) + [1− ϕ(a)]Q(x − a) ≤ Q(x)
for all x ∈ {1, . . . ,M−1} and a ∈ {0, . . . , x}. But this is ensured by (8) and (9). 
Our next statement is a counterpart to [1, Theorem 2.2] by M.-R. Chen and S.-R.
Hsiau and is in a sense dual to Theorem 2. A new inequality for the two-place win
probability function is introduced in order to derive the excessivity condition.
Theorem 3. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies (1) and
(10) P (x, a)P (x + a, b) ≤ P (x, a+ b)
for every x ∈ {0, . . . ,M} and a ∈ {0, . . . ,M − x} and b ∈ {0, . . . ,M − a}. We
consider a discrete two-person red-and-black game with the law of motions described
by formulas (2), (3) and (4). Assume that player I plays the bold strategy. Then
the timid strategy is best for player II.
Proof. Assume that at n-th stage of the game player II bets an amount of b. If
player I plays boldly, then his law of motions of is the form
Xn+1 =
{
Xn + b, with probability P (Xn, b),
0, with probability 1− P (Xn, b),
whenever 0 < Xn < M .
Denote by T (x) the probability of victory for player II who has an initial fortune
M − x. Clearly T (x) = 1−Q(x), where Q is defined in the proof of Theorem 2. In
view of Theorem 1 the proof will be completed when we prove that T is excessive.
In other words, we need to justify inequality
(11) P (x, b)T (x+ b) + [1− P (x, b)]T (0) ≤ T (x),
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for all x ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1} and b ∈ {0, . . . ,M − x}. Directly from the definition we
get T (0) = 1. Therefore, an equivalent formulation of (11) with the use of function
Q is simply
Q(x) ≤ P (x, b)Q(x+ b).
From inequality (10) we get
P (x, 1)P (x+ 1, 1) ≤ P (x, 2).
Using this and (10) once again one can prove inductively that
b−1∏
i=0
P (x+ i, 1) ≤ P (x, b).
Now, using the formula (9) for a = b− 1 and with x replaced by x− (b− 1), jointly
with the last inequality we derive
Q(x) =
b−1∏
i=0
P (x+ i, 1)Q(x+ b) ≤ P (x, b)Q(x+ b)
and the proof is completed. 
Joining both theorems we obtain a corollary which shows the existence of a
bold-timid Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 1. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies (1) and
(10) for every x ∈ {0, . . . ,M} and a ∈ {0, . . . ,M − x} and b ∈ {0, . . . ,M − a}.
Further, assume that the map ϕ : S → [0, 1] given by (6) is a nondecreasing solution
of (7) for x, y ∈ S such that y ≤ x. Then the bold-timid strategies is a Nash
equilibrium of the discrete two-person red-and-black game with the law of motions
described by formulas (2), (3) and (4).
3. Functional inequalities
In this section we will construct possibly large classes of functions solving in-
equalities (7) and (10), which play crucial roles in our model. Next section contains
examples and a discussion of some particular cases. We begin with inequality (10).
First, we will observe an easy but useful extension property.
Proposition 2. Assume that M ≥ 2 is a fixed integer and P : {0, . . . ,M} ×
{0, . . . ,M} → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies (10) for every x ∈ {0, . . . ,M}
and a ∈ {0, . . . ,M − x} and b ∈ {0, . . . ,M − a}. Then a map P˜ : Z × Z → [0, 1]
given by
P˜ (x, y) =


0, if x < 0 or y < 0,
1, if x+ y > M,
P (x, y), elsewhere,
solves (10) for all a, b, x ∈ Z.
Proof. Fix a, b, x ∈ Z arbitrarily. Observe that if at least one of numbers x, a, x+a, b
is nonpositive, then the left-hand side of (10) is equal to zero and (10) is satisfied,
since P˜ attains nonnegative values. If a + b < 0, then either a < 0 or b < 0 and
similarly the left-hand side of (10) vanishes. If x + a > M , then (10) reduces to a
trivial identity. In other cases (10) is satisfied by P˜ since P solves this inequality. 
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Note that it can happen that P˜ (x, y) 6= P (x, y) for some (x, y) ∈ {0, . . . ,M} ×
{0, . . . ,M}, but this is possible only in case x + y > M , which never happens in
the game.
In view of Proposition 2 we can study solutions of (10) defined on Z×Z, or more
generally, on the square of an Abelian group.
Proposition 3. Assume that (G,+) is an Abelian group and P : G × G → R
is a mapping which satisfies inequality (10) for every x, a, b ∈ G. Then a map
F : G×G→ R given by
(12) F (x, a) = P (x, a− x), a, x ∈ G,
is a solution to the multiplicative Sincov’s inequality:
(13) F (x, a) · F (a, b) ≤ F (x, b), a, b, x ∈ G.
Proof. Replace a by a− x in (10) to get
P (x, a− x)P (a, b + a− a) ≤ P (x, a+ b− x), a, b, x ∈ G
i.e.
F (x, a)F (a, b+ a) ≤ F (x, a+ b), a, b, x ∈ G.
Now, replace in this inequality b by b− a to prove (13). 
In [5] we solve inequality (13) on topological spaces. We are going to utilize our
results in a special case of Z×Z equipped with the discrete topology. Let us quote
[5, Corollary 3]. Assume that X is a nonempty set. Denote ∆ = {(x, x) : x ∈ X}.
Next, for a fixed mapping F : X ×X → (0,+∞) introduce a class of functions:
F(F ) =
{
f : X → (0,+∞) : ∀x,y∈X
f(x)
f(y)
≥ F (x, y)
}
.
The general solution of (13) is given in the following statement.
Corollary 2 ([5], Corollary 3). Assume that X is a topological separable space and
F : X ×X → (0,+∞) is a solution of (13) which is continuous and equal to 1 at
every point of ∆. Then
(14) F (a, b) = inf
{
f(a)
f(b)
: f ∈ F(F )
}
, a, b ∈ X.
Conversely, for an arbitrary family F of positive functions on X every mapping
F : X ×X → (0,+∞) defined by (14) solves (13), it is equal to 1 on ∆ and F ⊆
F(F ).
Note that if F : Z× Z → (0,+∞) is given by (12), then
P (a, b) = F (a, a+ b), a, b ∈ Z.
Moreover, from (1) we get F = 1 on ∆ and F (0, b) = 0 for b ∈ Z. Therefore, if F
is positive on N× N, then from Corollary 2 we obtain a representation of P :
P (a, b) = inf
{
f(a)
f(a+ b)
: f ∈ F(F )
}
, a, b ∈ N.
Denote
P(P ) =
{
f : N0 → [0,+∞) : f(0) = 0, f(a) > 0 for a > 0, ∀a,b∈N
f(a)
f(a+ b)
≥ P (a, b)
}
.
Therefore we have established the following description of solutions of inequality
(10) for mappings defined on N0.
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Corollary 3. Assume that P : N0 × N0 → [0,+∞) is a solution of (10) which
satisfies (1) and P (a, b) > 0 whenever a > 0. Then
(15) P (a, b) = inf
{
f(a)
f(a+ b)
: f ∈ P(P )
}
, a, b ∈ N0, a+ b > 0.
Conversely, for an arbitrary family P of functions on N0 which vanish only at
0 every mapping P : N0 × N0 → [0,+∞) defined by (15) and with P (0, 0) being
arbitrary solves (10), satisfies (1) and P (a, b) > 0 whenever a > 0.
Corollary 3 provides a method of construction of solutions of (10) starting with
an arbitrary family of functions. In order to force the function P given by formula
(15) to be a win probability function it is enough to assume that 1 ∈ P . Some
examples are provided in the next section.
Now, we will turn to inequality (7). We will provide a description of solutions in
case of differentiable functions defined on an interval. We will need the following
fact.
Proposition 4 ([4, Proposition 1]). Let I be a non-void open interval, let f : I → R
be a differentiable function and m ∈ R an arbitrary constant. Then
f ′(x) ≤ mf(x), x ∈ I,
if and only if there exists a nonincreasing and differentiable map d : I → R such
that
f(x) = d(x) exp(mx), x ∈ I.
For technical reasons we will assume that functions are defined on a half-open
interval containing zero as its left endpoint and we work with a one-sided derivative
at zero.
Theorem 4. Assume that ϕ : [0,M) → R is a differentiable function with a one-
sided derivative at 0. If ϕ solves (7) for all x, y ∈ [0,M ] such that y ≤ x, then
there exists a nondecreasing and differentiable map i : [0,M)→ R with a one-sided
derivative at 0 which satisfies
(16) ϕ(x) = i(x) exp(−cx) + 1, x ∈ [0,M),
where c = ϕ′(0). Conversely, if a nondecreasing map i : [0,M)→ R satisfies
(17) 0 ≤ i(t)i(y) + i(t+ y), t, y ∈ [0,M), t+ y ≤M,
c ∈ R is a constant, then a map ϕ : [0,M)→ R defined by (16) solves (7).
Proof. We begin with the first part. Fix t ∈ (0,M) and apply (7) for y = x − t to
get
ϕ(x − t)− ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(t)[ϕ(x − t)− 1].
From this we have
ϕ(x − t)− ϕ(x)
−t
≥ −
ϕ(t)
t
[ϕ(x− t)− 1].
Tending with t→ 0 and using the differentiability of ϕ we arrive at
ϕ′(x) ≥ −ϕ′(0)[ϕ(x) − 1], x ∈ (0,M).
Define f : [0,M)→ [0, 1] as f(x) = ϕ(x)−1 for x ∈ [0,M) and put c = ϕ′(0). Then
we have
(18) f ′(x) ≥ −cf(x), x ∈ (0,M).
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To finish this part of the proof it is enough to apply Proposition 4 with f replaced
by −f (we have m = −c and i = −d).
A straightforward calculation shows that for a given map i : [0,M)→ R function
ϕ : [0,M)→ R given by (16) with arbitrary c ∈ R is a solution to (7) if and only if
0 ≤ i(x− y)i(y) + i(x), x, y ∈ [0,M), y ≤ x,
which is true by (17) after substitution t = x− y. 
4. Examples and final remarks
First, we will show how a known example of win probability can be obtained as
a special case of our model with the aid of Corollary 3.
Example 1. Assume that we are given some number p ≥ 1. Define P as a family
consisting of exactly one function f : N0 → [0,+∞) given by f(t) = t
p for t ∈ N0.
Then P (a, b) = ap/(a + b)p. This win probability was introduced by M.-R. Chen
and S.-R. Hsiau [1, Example 2.2 and Example 2.4]. Note that (7) and (10) are
satisfied.
An curious example is provided by a family P consisting of a linear map and an
exponential.
Example 2. Letm ∈ (0,∞) be a fixed number. Define fi : N0 → [0,∞) for i ∈ {1, 2}
as
f1(k) = k, f2(k) = exp (mk) , k ∈ N
and fi(0) = 0. Therefore, for a, b ∈ N0 we have
P (a, b) = min
{
a
a+ b
, exp (−mb)
}
.
Next, observe that
a
a+ b
=
1
1 + b
a
≥
1
exp( b
a
)
= exp
(
−
b
a
)
for a, b ∈ N such that a > 1/m. Thus P (a, b) = exp (−mb), in particular in this
case the probability does not depend upon a. If player I plays boldly and his initial
fortune is large enough to meet the condition x0 > 1/m and player 2 plays timidly,
then the probability of winning a stage of the game for the first player is equal to
exp (−m), which can be close to zero if m is big. Moreover, it is clear that is not
best for player 1 to play boldly if his fortune exceeds the number ⌈1/m⌉, since he
can bet precisely ⌈1/m⌉ to obtain the same possible gain as playing boldly, but
with a smaller risk. This however does not contradict Theorem 2, since in this case
ϕ given by (6) is a constant map equal to exp(−m) and this is not a solution of
(7).
With the aid of Theorem 4 one can construct a family of functions which solve
(7). To obtain a win probability function one needs to find a nondecreasing function
i which satisfies (17) and such that ϕ given by (16) takes values in interval [0, 1] (for
the latter reason, one cannot take simply an arbitrary nonnegative nondecreasing
function as i). Denote k = −i. Clearly, i solves (17) if and only if k satisfies:
(19) k(t+ y) ≤ k(t)k(y), t, y ∈ [0,M), t+ y ≤M.
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Observe that if k takes values in the interval [0, 1] and the constant c is nonnegative,
then the map ϕ given by (16) with i = −k takes values in [0, 1], as well. We can
summarize this short argument in the following statement.
Corollary 4. Assume that c ≥ 0 is a constant and k : [0,M) → [0, 1] is a nonin-
creasing map which satisfies (19). Then function ϕ : [0,M)→ [0, 1] given by
(20) ϕ(x) = −k(x)e−cx + 1, x ∈ [0,M)
yields a nondecreasing solution to (7).
For a discussion of inequality (19) the reader is referred to the monograph E.
Hille and R.S. Phillips [6] (inequality (7.4.1) therein). Below we will examine the
simplest case with k = 1.
Example 3. Assume that M ∈ N and the win probability function P : [0,M ] ×
[0,M ]→ [0, 1] is given by
P (a, b) = −eb−a + 1, a, b ∈ [0,M ], b ≤ a
and P (a, b) = 0 if b > a. One can check that the game is neither sub- nor super
fair. Function ϕ given by (6) solves (7) and is represented by formula (20) with
k(x) = 1. Thus, all conditions of Theorem 2 are met. Note that P (x, x+1) = 0 for
all x ∈ S; in other words player II wins for sure if he bets more than his opponent.
This does not contradict Theorem 2, since we assume that player II plays timidly.
Therefore, in case when the initial fortunes of the two players satisfy x0 < y0, the
bold-timid strategy is not a Nash equilibrium, since player II playing boldly wins
for sure, regardless the strategy of his opponent.
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